來源：市場資訊

（來源：經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)刊）

近日，據(jù)JIBS官網(wǎng)顯示，來自香港中文大學(xué)（深圳）經(jīng)管學(xué)院的張博輝教授、上海交通大學(xué)安泰經(jīng)管學(xué)院的傅仁輝教授、東華大學(xué)旭日工商管理學(xué)院的高芳教授，以及東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會計(jì)學(xué)院的王彥慧教授合作撰寫的論文“ Bond Market Liberalization and Corporate Investment”在國際商務(wù)頂刊 Journal of International Business Studies 線上正式發(fā)表。

# 論文簡介 #

Title：

Bond Market Liberalization and Corporate Investment

Author：

Renhui Fu, Fang Gao, Yanhui Wang, Bohui Zhang

Abstract：

Limited evidence exists on the real effects of bond market liberalization, particularly on corporate investment behavior. This study examines the impact of bond market liberalization on corporate investment, exploiting the 2017 launch of China’s Bond Connect—which allows foreign investors to directly participate in the interbank bond market—as a quasi-natural experiment that increases firms’ exposure to foreign debtholders. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that bond market liberalization constrains corporate investment. Channel analyses reveal that this effect operates through tighter bond covenants, higher reputation costs, and increased litigation risk imposed by foreign bondholders. Consistent with a governance-based interpretation, the investment-reducing effect is more pronounced among firms with weaker governance structures, including fewer independent directors and less effective internal control systems. Importantly, the decline in investment is concentrated in overinvestment rather than value-enhancing projects, indicating that foreign bondholders discipline managerial empire-building without inducing excessive conservatism. Correspondingly, firms experience lower default risk, reduced credit spreads, and higher firm value following liberalization. Overall, our findings highlight the distinct, non–ownership-based governance role of foreign debtholders and suggest that bond market liberalization can foster efficiency and financial stability in emerging markets characterized by relatively weak domestic institutions.

標(biāo)題：

債券市場自由化與企業(yè)投資

中文摘要：

關(guān)于債券市場自由化的實(shí)際影響，尤其是對企業(yè)投資行為的影響，現(xiàn)有證據(jù)十分有限。本研究以2017年中國“債券通”的啟動為契機(jī)——該機(jī)制允許境外投資者直接參與銀行間債券市場，從而提高了企業(yè)對外國債券持有人的敞口——將其視為一次準(zhǔn)自然實(shí)驗(yàn)，考察債券市場自由化對企業(yè)投資的影響。采用雙重差分設(shè)計(jì)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)債券市場自由化抑制了企業(yè)投資。渠道分析表明，這一效應(yīng)通過外國債券持有人施加的更嚴(yán)格債券契約、更高聲譽(yù)成本和更大訴訟風(fēng)險(xiǎn)而發(fā)揮作用。與基于治理的解釋一致，投資抑制效應(yīng)在治理結(jié)構(gòu)較弱的企業(yè)中更為顯著，包括獨(dú)立董事較少和內(nèi)部控制體系有效性較低的企業(yè)。重要的是，投資下降主要集中在過度投資而非增值型項(xiàng)目上，這表明外國債券持有人約束了管理層的帝國建造行為，但并未引發(fā)過度保守主義。相應(yīng)地，自由化后企業(yè)面臨更低的違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、縮小的信用利差和更高的企業(yè)價(jià)值?？傮w而言，我們的研究結(jié)果凸顯了外國債券持有人獨(dú)特的、非基于所有權(quán)的治理角色，并表明在境內(nèi)制度相對薄弱的新興市場中，債券市場自由化能夠促進(jìn)效率提升和金融穩(wěn)定。